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1.Introduction. 
 Philippon (2012) documents the astonishing rise of the share of GDP coming from the 
financial sector since World War II (Figure 1).  Financial income rose from about 2% of the total in 
the 1940s to close to 8% at the time of the financial crisis.  Philippon and Reshef (2013) document 
similar trends in many other developed countries.  Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) show further 
that, at least in the last 30 years, much of this rise of finance in the United States comes from 
financial services to consumers, especially asset management and credit intermediation of 
mortgages and consumer loans. 
 The rapid growth of the financial sector has proved difficult to explain.  Perhaps 
productivity in finance, as in other services, does not grow as fast as that in other sectors, so we see 
a manifestation of the Baumol (1967) disease.  However, finance has grown relative to other 
services (Philippon and Reshef 2013), and wages in finance have grown faster than in other service 
sectors (Philippon and Reshef 2012), inconsistent with this theory.  Both Philippon (2012) and 
Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) find the growth of finance puzzling, and are a bit skeptical about 
the reasons.        
 We present a new model that addresses the evidence on the growth of finance.  Ours is a 
dynamic Solow-style growth model with a financial sector serving the financial needs of 
individuals.  The financial sector provides two services to savers.  The first is wealth preservation: 
financial intermediaries enable investors to preserve their savings for future consumption.   The 
second service is access to risky investment opportunities with superior expected return, which 
enables wealth to grow over time in expectation.   As a byproduct of serving investors, the financial 
sector also provides investment resources to firms.   
 Our critical assumption is that investors need financial intermediaries to take advantage of 
these opportunities.  On their own they only utilize highly inefficient self-storage, such as keeping 
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money in mattresses or in gold.  Intermediaries offer savers knowledge of and access to financial 
products that they do not have otherwise.  In Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012), we refer to the 
intermediaries providing such services, be they bankers, brokers, wealth planners, or money 
managers, as “money doctors.”  Our analogy captures the idea that even though generic investing in 
risky assets seems straightforward to economists and finance professors, it actually requires 
knowledge and confidence that most savers simply do not have.   We follow Gennaioli et al in 
assuming that savers rely on money doctors to help them with risky financial choices.  Moreover, as 
in that model and in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004, 2008), trust in money doctors shapes 
investor risk-taking and competition in the industry.   Specifically, we assume that investors are less 
anxious investing through intermediaries whom they know and trust.  Intermediaries competitively 
set their fees to attract clients, but because some intermediaries have a “locational” advantage of 
being especially trusted by some clients, in equilibrium intermediaries charge positive fees that 
capture a share of expected returns on investments.   
 We analyze the dynamics of this model of capital accumulation and growth under the 
neoclassical assumption of diminishing returns to capital.   We consider both the case of a fixed 
number of intermediaries, and of competitive entry by intermediaries, which yield similar results.  
The model predicts the growth of the finance share in GDP for the following reason.  Recall that 
finance in our specification delivers two services to investors: growth and wealth preservation.  
With diminishing returns to capital, growth opportunities diminish over time, and so does the 
growth rate of GDP.  Because it tracks returns to capital, this segment of financial services is a 
constant share of GDP.  However, finance performs a second service, wealth preservation.  Because 
the service of wealth preservation tracks wealth, and not GDP, the ratio of this part of financial 
income to GDP rises over time along with the ratio of wealth to GDP along the convergence path.  
Putting the two parts together, finance grows as a share of GDP, precisely because one of its main 
functions is to preserve the stock of wealth that, over time, is growing relative to GDP. 
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 The basic neoclassical implication of the model, from which most others follow, is the 
growth of the ratio of wealth to GDP as the economy converges to the steady state.  A recent 
presentation by Piketty and Zucman (2012) shows that over the long term this is indeed the case for 
many developed countries.  We show for the US that the ratio of wealth to GDP has indeed 
increased for several plausible measures of wealth.        
 The model also delivers an important prediction that the cost of financial services falls over 
time.  There are two reasons for this in the model, which focuses on investment fees.  First, 
equilibrium fees are a share of expected returns in our model.  As capital accumulates, and expected 
returns on capital decline, so do the expected returns on financial assets and management fees.  In 
addition, in a free entry model, as the demand for financial services rises with wealth, there is entry 
by new money managers, who get “closer” to the investors, making finance more individualized.  
Competition between money managers also leads to the decline in fees over time. 
 Our model also sheds light on the empirical question of the evolution of costs of finance.  
Philippon (2012) suggests that unit costs of finance have remained constant.  French (2008) and 
Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) find that management fees on equity mutual funds have fallen 
over time, but overall fees, including those on private equity and hedge funds, have stayed roughly 
constant.  Philippon and Reshef (2013) also point to the declining costs of financial intermediation 
in most countries outside the US.   In our model, fees on standard products fall over time, in line 
with French (2008) and Philippon-Reshef (2013).  At the same time, the composition of investor 
portfolios tilts toward higher risk, intermediated (and therefore higher fee) financial products, which 
might explain why unit fees as measured by Philippon (2012) have not declined.      
 The gradual path of convergence to the steady state cannot account for two striking 
fluctuations in the size of the financial sector.  First, Figure 1 illustrates the sharp decline in the 
financial sector in the Great Depression, which lasted for several decades.  Second, the size of the 
financial sector since the Great Depression has grown relative to income and even wealth.  To 
5 
 
account for such evidence, our model’s central ingredient of trust as the lubricant of financial 
services proves critical.  In our framework, the decline of finance in the Great Depression is 
explained as a decline in trust in the financial sector that took decades to rebuild.  Indeed, it is 
difficult to imagine that technological parameters alone can account for the decline of finance share 
that took half a century to reverse, way longer than the recovery of productivity or of the real 
economy.  Likewise, the growth of the financial sector since the Great Depression can be explained 
by growing investor trust in financial markets, as illustrated by the dramatic growth in stock market 
participation.  In our model, trust may have increased both for exogenous reasons, as the memory of 
the Great Depression receded, and endogenous reasons, since increases in wealth encouraged entry 
by intermediaries, who got “closer” to their clients and therefore became more trusted.   
 In Section 2, we describe our model.  Section 3 presents the equilibrium in the financial 
sector.  Section 4 considers the full equilibrium in the growth model, and discusses the relationship 
between the model’s empirical implications and the available evidence.  Section 5 extends the 
model to the case with endogenous entry of financial intermediaries.  Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. The Setup 
This section introduces the key ingredients of the model: the household sector, financial 
intermediation, and the productive sector. 
 
2.1 The Household Sector 
The economy is inhabited by overlapping generations of young and old.  Time starts at 
    and goes on forever. A generation born at time     contains a continuum of workers of size 
one, indexed by        [   ]. At   –   , during their young age, these workers inelastically 
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supply their unit labor endowments at the equilibrium wage     .  The entire wage income is saved 
and invested as described below, and consumption takes place only in old age after investment 
income is received.  At the end of  , the old generation dies without bequest.  We describe an 
economy with no population growth or technological progress.  These assumptions do not change 
our results, but an extension relaxing both assumptions in presented in Appendix B.1.  
Workers can invest their resources in two ways.  First, they can invest their income in safe 
self-storage. Each unit stored at     yields     units at  , so that     is lost in depreciation.  
We think of storage as an inefficient way to save on one’s own, perhaps by holding cash or gold at 
home, or perhaps by keeping all the money in the bank.  The case of     captures a perfect self-
storage technology.  Second, a worker can hire a financial intermediary, whom we refer to as a 
money manager throughout, to invest his savings in a risky financial asset.  At the beginning of time 
 , the money manager transforms a worker’s resources (one for one) into capital, and rents it to 
firms, which use it to produce output at the end of time  .  We later describe production in detail. 
In the model, we draw a sharp distinction between self-storage, which requires no 
intermediation, and risky investments, which require money managers.  In reality, the gradation is 
more continuous, from cash in mattresses and gold, to bank savings, to liquid market investments, 
to illiquid investments such as private equity and hedge funds, with increasing amounts of 
intermediary attention (and cost).  We view our sharp differentiation as a simplifying assumption.       
There are a discrete number     of money managers in each generation, randomly 
selected from the young.  A generic money manager active at time   is indexed by     . This 
money manager charges his investors a profit-maximizing fee     per unit of investment.  At time   
all managers invest in the same asset, which yields a stochastic gross return    with mean  {  } 
and variance   , both of which are determined endogenously in equilibrium.  A worker/saver born 
at time     delegating at the beginning of time   his risky investment to manager   thus earns a net 
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return       .  If the income share invested at time   in the risky asset is   , the worker’s 
consumption in old age is given by:  
          [     (        )]. 
Consumption increases in the excess return that risky financial assets earn relative to storage (net of 
the management fee).  We impose the constraint          – which in Proposition 1 we verify to 
hold in equilibrium – because we are interested in cases where risk taking is interior.   
After receiving the wage      at the end of period    , worker        chooses at the 
beginning of time   how much of that wage to invest in the risky asset, in storage, and which money 
manager   {     } to hire, so as to solve: 
                       [      (        )        
   
  
 
]                         
The preferences of workers are mean-variance with respect to the return of their portfolio. 2   
Critically, the utility of the investor   depends on the identity of manager   through the fee 
    charged by j and through the manager-investor specific risk aversion parameter     > 1, which 
we think of as the anxiety   experiences investing with  .  As in Gennaioli et al. (2012), saver   sees 
risk as being more costly with manager  , anxiety     as higher, the lower is the trust of   for  .  
Investors are less anxious when taking risk with more trusted managers, perhaps because they know 
them or their representatives personally, or perhaps because they are persuaded by advertisement. 
We thus capture lower trust of   in   by a higher value of the anxiety parameter    . 
                                                          
2This objective function arises under quadratic utility when the agent’s risk aversion is decreasing in his initial 
(pre-investment) wealth endowment, namely when:  
               
 
 
       
where consumption is the realized investment return, i.e.       ̌   . This utility function avoids the 
unappealing feature of standard quadratic utility that the share of wealth invested in the risky asset decreases 
with wealth . It is also more tractable than constant relative risk aversion, which requires lognormal returns 
and analytical approximations that complicate optimal fee setting by money managers.      
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2.2 Financial Intermediation 
A worker’s demand for the risky asset depends on his trust for different money managers 
and on the fees these managers charge.  At each time   savers are uniformly distributed around the 
unit circle.  Each manager   is also located along the circle at a constant distance       from the 
adjacent managers.  The number of managers is exogenously fixed at   (we endogenize   in 
Section 5), and the trust of worker   in manager   is given by: 
 
   
                                                                              
where     is the distance along the circle between the worker and the manager.  The greater is the 
distance between worker   and manager  , the lower is trust and the higher is the worker’s risk 
aversion.3  Parameter     captures the maximal distance at which investor   is willing to delegate. 
If      , the investor suffers infinite anxiety, namely      , and so he only uses the storage 
technology.  Two managers located at distance   compete for some investors as long as      .  
An investor located halfway between these two managers is willing to take some risk with either of 
them.  When        investors located in the middle suffer infinite anxiety from hiring either 
manager.  As a consequence, these investors do not take any risk and each manager has a small, 
captive, clientele.  As we show below, whether general trust   is above or below     has interesting 
implications for the effect of competition on equilibrium fees.  
At time   each money manager sets his fee for the generation of savers born at    .  This 
results in a profile                  of money managers’ fees.  Given this profile, each worker   
                                                          
3 Equation (2) captures investor trust in money managers. As a consequence,     is zero when the money 
manager invests his own money, but not when a saver takes risk on his own.  In fact, savers neither trust 
themselves nor other savers for risky investment.  For simplicity, we assume that investors have zero trust 
(their risk aversion is infinite) with respect to homemade or non-professionally managed risk taking.      
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chooses, based on his trust as described by (2), which manager to invest with and how much risky 
investment to undertake. The optimal policy of a worker        is summarized by a vector 
[   
     ]     
 that takes nonzero value only for the manager to whom the worker delegates his 
risky investment.  This vector is the solution of the investor’s problem described in Equation (1). 
The optimal investment policy depends on time only through the fees    set by managers at time  . 
This implies that at a fee profile   , the profit earned by a generic money manager j from time   
investment is given by: 
            [∫     
     
 
  ]                                                           
We consider symmetric Nash equilibria in which each manager   sets the same optimal fee 
  
  identified by the condition: 
  
                        |       
    
Before computing workers’ investment decisions and management fees, we describe the production 
structure of the model. 
 
2.3 The Productive Sector 
There are two inputs: labor and capital, available in aggregate supply      and   , 
respectively.  We assume that capital can be converted back into consumption at no cost, but 
Appendix B.2 shows that our main results continue to hold when we relax this assumption.  Inputs 
at time   are owned by workers (labor is owned by the young born at time  , capital is owned by the 
old who are born at time    ) and hired by firms in competitive markets.  The production 
technology is risky. If an individual firm hires    units of capital and    units of labor it produces: 
           [        
   
   ]                                                              
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In (4),    is an i.i.d shock with mean  {  }    and variance  .  Uncertainty is realized at the end of 
period       output is produced. The value of a firm consists of two components.  The first is its 
value added        
   
   , where   captures the firm’s total factor productivity. The second 
component is the capital stock    used in production, which the firm returns to investors 
undepreciated (up to the stochastic shock   ).    
At time  , before the shock    is realized, firms hire capital and labor.  Workers are hired on 
the spot market and are remunerated with a deterministic equilibrium wage   .  The remuneration 
of capital is risky since it fully adjusts to the realization of the shock   , and is paid to the holders of 
the firm’s financial claims.  These claims are bought by savers via money managers and pay an 
equilibrium return    with expected value  {  } and risk   .  The return    is thus determined by 
the firms’ investment and by   .  
  
3. Equilibrium in the Money Management Sector 
To solve a worker’s portfolio problem and a manager’s profit maximization problem, we 
take wages and expected asset returns as given.  These variables are computed in the next section.  
At time  , each saver – after collecting his period   –    wages – optimally chooses a money 
manager and an amount of risky investment to solve Equation (1).  If worker   selects money 
manager  , he invests in the risky asset a share          of his wealth    .  This share is given by: 
         
 (        )
     
                                                                  
where          is assumed to be in       (Proposition 1 verifies that this is the case).  The saver 
invests               in the risky asset and [          ]       in storage.  Risk taking increases 
in the excess return paid by the risky asset and in investor trust, but decreases in the risk    of the 
financial asset.  Consider now a worker’s decision of which money manager to hire.   
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Figure 2 depicts the case with three managers, in which an investor    is located between 
managers    and   .  Consider the case when investors do not suffer infinite anxiety with either of 
the two closest managers, i.e.,      . 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
In this situation (and focusing on small deviations from a symmetric equilibrium), the 
investor chooses between the two closest managers     and   .  This implies that in setting his fee a 
generic manager, say   , competes for investors on his right against    and for investors on his left 
against    .  To see the implications of this logic for fee setting, consider the general case in which 
an investor   chooses between his two closest managers   and   .  Denote the distance between 
investor   and his left-adjacent manager   by  .  Since the distance between managers is  , the 
distance between the same investor and his right-adjacent manager    is    .  In light of Equation 
(2), these distances pin down in Equation (5) the investor’s risky investment with either manager.  
By plugging these optimal risky investments into the investor’s objective function of Equation (1), 
we can show that investor   obtains a higher utility by delegating his investment to manager   rather 
than to manager    if and only if: 
   (        )           
 
[
 (        )
 (         )
]
 
  
                                         
j  
j  
j  
i  
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Investor   thus hires manager   when the above condition holds and manager    otherwise.  
Intuitively, the investor delegates his risky portfolio to manager   when his trust in   is sufficiently 
high, as captured by a sufficiently small distance   from  .  Other things equal, delegation to 
manager   is also more likely when   charges a lower fee (    is lower) and the competing manager 
   charges a higher fee (     is higher). 
 Consider now optimal fee setting by manager  . With the assumed circular structure, a 
generic manager   competes for investors against his neighbors on the left and the right.  Manager   
attracts investors who – according to (6) – are sufficiently close to him. This implies that, if two 
competing managers    and     set the equilibrium fees              
 , then the profit of manager   
from setting fee     is given by: 
           ∫       
 (        )
  
   
 (      
 )
 
  
where  (      
 ) is the maximal distance at which an investor   prefers to hire manager   at fee     
to hiring his closest competitor at the equilibrium fee   
 .  Maximization of the above profit function 
yields the (sufficient) first order condition: 
 (         )  ∫         
 (      
 )
 
 
  (      
 )
    
[   (      
 )]       (        )     
At a symmetric equilibrium       
 , we obtain the following result.  All proofs appear in 
Appendix A.  
 
Lemma 1 The equilibrium fee at time   is given by: 
  
  [
 
 
 (
 
  
)
 
]  
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where    .  Management fees increase with the expected return on the risky asset. Furthermore, 
for       – which is equivalent to      , fees decrease in the number of managers  and in 
the generalized trust   that investors have in the financial sector as a whole.  
 
From the empirical standpoint, unit fees in our model correspond to the ratio between 
aggregate financial sector income   
     and intermediated wealth   .  As in Gennaioli et al. (2012), 
equilibrium fees capture a constant fraction of the excess return expected on the risky asset.  This 
sharing rule is intuitive: managers extract part of the surplus they enable their trusting investors to 
access. The fraction   of return extracted by managers decreases as trust in all managers   rises. 
When investors trust all managers, competition among them is very intense, which drives down 
fees.  If      , fees also drop as the number of managers  rises.  Intuitively, competition 
between highly trusted managers lowers their market power and fees.  Fees fall to zero as managers 
fill the entire circle, namely as   .  In the remainder, we focus on the case where      .4       
By plugging Equation (7) into the optimal portfolio of Equation (5), we can show that 
investor   places in the risky asset a share of wealth given by: 
         
             
     
  
In equilibrium, each investor hires the closest manager and each manager attracts the same 
amount of wealth.  As a consequence, the aggregate share of wealth invested in the risky asset at  , 
which we denote by    , is the product of the number of managers   and the share of wealth 
managed by each of them.  This aggregate share is given by:  
                                                          
4
 The case       has some interesting properties.  When there are very few managers, a potentially large 
measure of investors located between any two managers does not take any risk.  In this case, an entering 
manager could exploit monopoly (or quasi) monopoly profits by locating close to such excluded investors. In 
this scenario, entry of new money managers increases participation into risk taking while exerting limited (or 
no) downward pressure on the fees charged by existing managers.    
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    ∬         
   
         [      
       
  
 ∫        
 
 
 
]   
 
            
  
 (  
 
 
)                                                   
where the expression in square brackets captures the wealth share invested by the clients to the right 
of a manager.  With symmetry, the wealth share managed by an individual manager is twice the 
amount in square brackets.  Equation (8) says that the share of wealth invested in the risky asset 
increases in the asset’s excess return (net of fees) per unit of risk, in overall trust  , and in the 
number of managers    .  As trust in money managers increases, fees drop, investors become less 
anxious and are willing to take more risk. 
  
4. General Equilibrium Dynamics 
4.1 Production, Wages and Asset Returns  
At time  , before observing   , a generic firm hires labor and capital to maximize expected 
profits: 
         {             
   
             }  
which are equal to total output (inclusive of both value added and the capital stock) minus factor 
payments.  Profit maximization yields the optimality conditions: 
       
   
       
      
     
     {  }  
The marginal product of labor is equated to the wage rate, and the average marginal product of 
capital is equated to the average (gross) return of financial assets  {  }.   
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Because the real wage is deterministic, the firm’s wage bill is also deterministic, given by 
             
   
   .  The production function then implies that, upon the realization of a shock 
  , the resources available to the firm’s capital suppliers are              
   
    
        
   
   .  The rate of return per unit of capital in state    is therefore given by: 
             
     
            
     
     
By taking the expected value of the above expression, one can immediately see that the expected 
return  {  } is equal to the average marginal product of capital [      
     
   ], as in the first 
order condition above.  With constant returns to scale, remunerating capital with the residual of 
output after the wage bill is paid is consistent with optimality.  Evaluated at the aggregate 
endowments    and     , the equilibrium wage and expected return are then given by: 
        
                                                                             
      
     {  }                                                                
Furthermore, by using the above expression for    we can show that the variance of returns is equal 
to             [     
   ] . 
 
4.2 Evolution of the Financial Sector 
We can now characterize the evolution of the economy.  The total amount of risky 
investment at time  , which buys the aggregate capital stock   , is equal to the past aggregate wage 
bill    , times the share of this wealth invested with money managers: 
            
Using Equations (9), we can rewrite this equation as: 
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By plugging equilibrium returns and variance into equation (8), we can compute the aggregate share 
of wealth invested in the risky asset, which is given by: 
   
            
      
 [     
   ] 
 (  
 
 
)                                        
Equations (11) and (12) fully characterize the dynamics of the economy.  The law of motion 
of the capital stock in (11) is very similar to that obtained in a standard Solow model, with the main 
difference that now the amount of resources invested in the economy depends, through   , on the 
equilibrium fees set by money managers and on the risk-return profile entailed by real investment. 
In Appendix A we prove that, by combining (11) and (12) we obtain the following result: 
 
Proposition 1 If         , there are two thresholds  ̅  and  , with  ̅   , such that, for 
  (   ̅) the economy admits a unique nonzero steady state level of capital   at which individual 
risk taking is interior and aggregate risk taking is given by      .  The steady state is locally 
stable and displays the following properties: 
i) The steady state capital stock weakly increases with the level of productivity and with 
the number of money managers, formally         ⁄          ⁄  
ii) Risk taking increases with the level of productivity and with the number of money 
managers, formally         ⁄          ⁄     
 
When the volatility   of the productivity shock is intermediate, the economy monotonically 
converges to a unique steady state level of financial intermediation and investment.5  The steady 
                                                          
5 The role of production risk is intuitive. If   is too low, people are very eager to invest in the risky asset. 
Some or all of them give all of their wealth to money managers, setting     
    .  Condition     rules out 
this possibility.  If   is very high, the variance of the risky asset decreases very fast with the capital stock. 
This can be a source of multiplicity: some equilibria are characterized by low investment and high risk (which 
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state level of capital increases in productivity  . When investment becomes more productive, the 
wage earned by the young and the average return promised by money managers rise.  Both effects 
increase financial intermediation, investment and output in the economy.  An increase in the 
number       of money managers also increases financial intermediation, investment and 
output in the steady state.  There are two reasons for this.  First, when  increases, investors can 
find a more trusted money manager, increasing – for given fees – their propensity to invest.  
Second, a higher  increases competition among money managers, reducing equilibrium fees and 
increasing for a given level of an investor’s trust the investor’s risk appetite.   
One important property of our model is that the steady state is locally stable.  That is, an 
economy starting below or above the steady state monotonically converges to it.  Figure 3 
graphically represents this convergence process.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Similarly to the standard neoclassical growth models, the main source of stability is 
diminishing returns to capital.  As the capital stock increases, wages and national income rise.  This 
raises the demand for financial assets by savers.  The increase in financial assets further increases 
the capital stock and thus output next period.  The growth rate of the capital stock however declines 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
vindicates low investment), while other equilibria feature high investment and low risk (vindicating high 
investment). Condition    ̅ rules out this possibility.            
𝐾  𝐾𝑡 
𝐾𝑡+  
𝐾  
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over time, because new resources are invested at progressively lower returns.  Growth stops 
eventually and the steady state is attained.6     
This convergence process has interesting implications for the financial sector. In particular, 
how do fees and money management profits change as the economy grows over time?   We address 
these issues below. 
      
Corollary 1 Suppose that the economy starts below the steady state, namely     
    During the 
transition to the steady state: 
i) The unit fee charged by money managers, which is given by: 
  
              [          
   ]                                    
decreases over time as capital accumulates.  
ii) The total income of the financial sector increases over time, at a higher speed than value 
added.  The ratio of financial sector income over value added (GDP), is given by: 
            
   
    [(
   
 
)    
     ]                                      
 
  As the economy accumulates capital, there are more resources for financial intermediation.  
At the same time, diminishing returns to physical capital (   ) imply that ceteris paribus these 
additional resources are employed at a lower marginal return.  This explains why unit management 
fees fall along the transition.  As capital deepening reduces the expected excess return on the risky 
asset, it also reduces the surplus that money managers can extract from investors.  Declines in 
expected returns in turn reduce the rents available for money managers, as reflected in their unit fee. 
                                                          
6
 Unlike in the standard Solow model, however, diminishing returns are not enough to guarantee stability, 
because in our model risk taking by households increases as the capital stock grows.  This phenomenon 
creates the possibility of explosive paths on which capital accumulation begets further risk taking and capital 
accumulation. The upper bound on the variance of shocks ensures stability by reducing the sensitivity of risk 
taking to the capital stock. 
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  Despite this reduction in unit fees, the aggregate income earned by money managers grows 
over time.  This is because the growth in the size of the intermediated wealth    more than 
compensates for the reduction in unit fees, and causes financial sector income to rise over time.  In 
our model financial sector income grows faster than value added, so the ratio of financial sector 
income to GDP grows over time.    
To understand this result, recall that in our model financial sector income can be viewed as 
remuneration for two services.  The first is a “wealth preservation” service: money managers allow 
savers to access investment opportunities which on average return the initial un-depreciated capital 
and are thus better than self-storage.  The second is a “growth” service:  money managers enable 
savers to earn part of the capital income generated by these productive investment opportunities.  In 
equilibrium, money managers are remunerated for both services.  The remuneration for wealth 
preservation is equal to         , which is the product of the per unit of return fee   times the 
surplus created by managers relative to riskless storage.  Intuitively, wealth preservation is more 
expensive the worse is the return on riskless storage (i.e., the lower is  ).  The remuneration for the 
growth service is equal to the per unit of return fee times capital income, namely        
 .  This 
remuneration increases in total value added    
  and in the share   of the value added that 
remunerates capital.  As capital stock grows, the remuneration for both wealth preservation and 
growth services rises, in turn increasing the aggregate income of the financial sector. 
Why does the total financial income grow faster than GDP?  Consider the financial sector’s 
growth services and wealth preservation separately.  As a product of real growth opportunities, 
income from growth services grows at the same rate as GDP.  Indeed, as shown by the second term 
in Equation (14), the remuneration for growth services is a constant fraction     of aggregate 
GDP.  On the other hand, the first term in Equation (14) shows that the wealth preservation service 
grows faster than GDP.  The remuneration for this service grows linearly with the capital stock   , 
which in turn grows faster than GDP: while value added is subject to decreasing returns, capital 
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preservation is not.  The fact that a portion of the financial services is dedicated to preserving the 
wealth of the economy, and not to the shrinking pool of new profitable investment projects,7 causes 
the ratio of financial to total income to rise over time. 
 
4.3. Empirical Predictions.    
Our model yields several empirical predictions, some consistent with the available 
evidence, some new.  To begin, our model turns the standard neoclassical prediction that the capital 
to income ratio increases during transitional growth into a novel rationale for Philippon’s (2012) 
and Philippon and Reshef’s (2013) finding that the financial sector grows relative to GDP.  As past 
economic growth causes the accumulation of considerable wealth, workers (who own the financial 
claims on the capital stock) seek wealth preservation opportunities more attractive than self-storage.  
Trusted money managers provide access to such opportunities, which allows them to extract a 
fraction of the growing wealth.  As the availability of profitable investment opportunities declines, 
the economy-wide wealth to income ratio rises, causing the relative income of the financial sector 
to rise over time.  It is not that finance slows down economic growth by driving resources away 
from productive opportunities.  It is rather the fact that productive opportunities diminish and past 
wealth must be preserved that allows the financial sector to expand relative to the productive sector. 
The principal mechanism of the model, and thus its basic prediction, is the growing wealth 
to GDP ratio in the economy.  Figure 4 presents this ratio, computed for both total and financial 
wealth, for the United States, and shows that it rises over time.  A presentation by Piketty and 
                                                          
7 In Equation (14) we exclude storage services or capital preservation from the definition of GDP in the 
denominator order to illustrate most starkly our results.  The growing relative size of the financial sector is 
however robust to alternative definitions. For instance, if one includes financial sector income into GDP, 
defining the latter as              
 , finance still increases as a share of GDP provided     , which 
always holds. But even if one takes the broadest notion of GDP to include the entire capital stock, namely 
      
 , finance would still increase as a share of GDP provided      . 
21 
 
Zucman (2012) shows for several developed countries that the ratio of wealth to GDP indeed grows 
over long stretches of time, although they do not connect this finding to the growth of finance.  
The model so far also predicts the decline in management fees over time.  As capital 
accumulates, the expected return on capital declines and equilibrium fees, which are a share of 
expected return, decline as well.  It is precisely the same force of declining marginal product of 
capital that drives both the decline in fees and the increase in finance share.  French (2008) 
documents the decline in management fees over time.  However, Philippon (2012) finds that, in the 
United States, unit costs of finance have not declined, while Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013) 
attribute this to a shift to higher fee products.  We attempt to reconcile this evidence after extending 
our model to incorporate entry by money managers in Section 5.      
 
4.4.  Fluctuations in the Size of the Financial Sector  
We have so far focused on long term trends and have ignored fluctuations in the size of the 
financial sector, evident in Figure 1.  Our model also allows us to analyze the short and long run 
responses of the financial sector to shocks.  We compare the effects of two permanent shocks: a 
permanent drop in productivity   and a drop in the overall level of trust in the financial sector  , 
owing for instance to the erosion of investor confidence during a large scale financial crisis.  Our 
model describes how the financial sector adjusts to these shocks. 
 
Corollary 2 Suppose that an economy is originally in a steady state        .  
i) Productivity   permanently drops to     .  On impact, at a given initial capital stock 
        investment drops, financial intermediation drops, but financial sector income 
increases relative to GDP. Over time, the capital stock and intermediation decrease to 
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the new steady state                 , and financial sector income relative to 
GDP returns to the initial level.         
ii) Trust   permanently drops to     . On impact, at a given initial capital stock 
        unit investment and financial intermediation drop, and financial sector 
income decreases relative to GDP.  Over time, the capital stock and intermediation 
gradually fall to the new steady state                 , and financial sector 
income decreases relative to GDP.   
 
A drop in either productivity or trust causes financial intermediation to shrink, both in the 
short and in the long run (at least weakly).  In the short run, the two types of shocks entail different 
responses in the relative size of the financial sector.  While a drop in productivity causes the relative 
size of the financial sector to increase, a drop in trust causes the relative size of the financial sector 
to decline.   This is because the drop in productivity reduces GDP and growth opportunities a lot but 
leaves the wealth preservation service of the financial sector relatively unaffected.  As a 
consequence, the financial sector shrinks less than GDP, increasing the share of national income 
going to finance. In contrast, a drop in trust reduces the remuneration of both the wealth 
preservation and growth services of the financial sector.  Although such a drop also reduces 
investment and income, on impact it exerts a much more drastic effect on the financial sector 
income, causing the relative size of finance to drop.   
In our model, permanents shocks to productivity or trust can generate long lasting boom 
and bust cycles to the size of the financial sector.  As trust suddenly dissipates (owing, for instance, 
to a financial crisis), individual take money out of the financial sector and put it into mattresses 
(self-storage).  This reduces financial intermediation and the financing of profitable investment 
opportunities.  Income reductions reduce the stock of wealth, further undermining the ability to 
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finance investment in the future.  This process generates a persistent contraction in financial 
intermediation and income until the new, lower, equilibrium is attained. 
Corollary 2 may help make sense of the one dramatic fluctuation in the size of the financial 
sector in the United States, namely the collapse of its income from 6 to 2 percent of GDP in the 
great depression, which took 40 years to fully reverse (Figure 1).  The Great Depression in all 
likelihood combined a decline in productivity with a sharp decline in trust in the financial system.  
Corollary 2 suggests that both of these factors should have led to a progressive decline in the total 
amount of intermediated wealth.  On the other hand, the fact that the income share going to the 
financial sector immediately shrunk underscore the role of the decline in trust.  This is consistent 
also with the fact that the financial sector started to grow again only after World War II, and 
reached its prewar size only in the 1980s, decades after the productivity and the wealth of the US 
economy have substantially surpassed their pre-Depression levels.  Only the slow decades-long 
return of trust enabled the financial sector to reach new heights as the wealth of the US economy 
expanded. 
 
5. Entry into the Financial Sector 
Our analysis has so far focused on the dynamics of fees and of financial intermediaries’ 
income as shaped by the progressive exhaustion of investment opportunities (the diminishing 
returns assumption).  We have so far neglected another important dimension of financial sector 
evolution, namely entry of new financial intermediaries, which was precluded by the assumption 
that the number of money managers is fixed at     . 
We now allow for endogenous entry of financial intermediaries.  Formally, we allow the 
distance between two adjacent money managers to change over time.  Denote the distance at time   
by    and the corresponding number of financial intermediaries by        .  For notational 
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simplicity we treat this variable as continuous, even though the number of active intermediaries is 
equal to the largest integer below  .  We assume that creating a new money management firm at 
time   costs      
  units of consumption, where    .  This cost should be viewed as the value of 
labor that the founder must expend in order to setup the new financial intermediary and to earn the 
trust of investors (indeed, the opportunity cost of time at   is equal to the wage rate, which scales 
with value added).8  Money managers can enter/exit at any time, so current profits are the only 
determinants of entry decisions.  Finally, money managers appear in discrete and thus negligible 
numbers, so entry of additional managers leaves the labor supply of productive firms unchanged.   
Generalizing our previous analysis, equilibrium fees at time   are now given by: 
  
                                [
  
 
 (
  
  
)
 
]                           
The fee       per unit of excess return increases in    because competition among money 
managers is less intense when there are fewer managers (   is higher). 
 
5.1 Entry and Equilibrium Dynamics  
If at time   a number      of money managers is active, the total profits of the financial 
sector are equal to   
          [           
 ].  At time    money managers enter until the 
profit earned by each of them is equal to the setup cost.  This condition is given by: 
  
   
  
          [            
 ]       
                                
By dividing both sides by    
 , we can rewrite the equilibrium entry condition as: 
                                                          
8 In this formalization, entry entails a redistribution of managers along the unit circle.  This redistribution 
allows all money managers, including the ones entering at  , to be located at the same distance   . We assume 
that it is costless for existing managers to relocate along the circle, while it is costly to acquire the necessary 
generalized trust to operate a firm.      
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         [       
     ]                                                     
Here       captures the fee charged by each money manager per unit of service provided 
(be it wealth preservation or growth).  This component increases with    because a drop in the 
number of managers raises fees and the aggregate income of each manager.  
The second term    [       
     ] on the left hand side captures the share of the 
aggregate value of money managers’ services to aggregate income provided by each individual 
manager at time  .  As shown in the previous section, this ratio increases with the capital stock    
because financial intermediaries’ wealth preservation service becomes relatively more important as 
the country becomes richer.  This feature drives one key property of the entry model, which we 
summarize in the result below. 
 
Lemma 2 Consider a path along which the capital stock    increases over time.  Equation (17) 
implies that along this path: 
i) The number of active money managers increases (i.e.,    drops) over time. 
ii) The management fees charged per unit of capital fall over time, owing both to the drop 
in       as new money managers enter, and to the fall in the marginal return to capital 
as    increases. 
iii) The aggregate income of the financial sector increases over time, both in absolute 
terms and relative to the country’s aggregate income.                 
 
As the capital stock expands, there are more resources available for intermediation.  For 
given fees, money management becomes more profitable, so incurring the setup cost      
  
becomes worthwhile.  This stimulates entry of new money managers, leading to a drop in    until 
the profits available to an entering money manager drop back to the setup cost.  In this process, 
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management fees drop.  Part of this effect is due, as in the previous section, to the fact that capital 
deepening reduces the marginal return on capital and thus the surplus each money manager can 
extract.  Entry, however, introduces another mechanism whereby fees drop: the drop in    
intensifies competition among money managers, reducing equilibrium fees      . 
Despite the drop in unit fees, the aggregate profits of the financial sector increase over time. 
As before, the expansion in the capital stock increases the demand for financial services.  This 
force, which increases profits, is so strong that it more than offsets the drop in fees.  Financial sector 
income increases not only in absolute terms but also relative to GDP.  In equation (17), the left hand 
side must stay constant, which implies that the total income share absorbed by finance       
[       
     ] increases as higher capital stock    causes    to drop. 
Lemma 2 considers what happens to entry and to the size of the financial sector as the 
capital stock    grows over time.  We still need to verify, however, that with endogenous entry our 
model delivers an increasing path for the capital stock.  In this case, the law of motion of the 
economy is still captured by Equations (11) and (12) with the only difference that now also       
and    evolve according to Equation (17).  In the appendix we then prove the following result. 
 
Proposition 2 If the parametric conditions of Proposition 1 hold, and in addition productivity   is 
sufficiently high, the entry model admits a unique and locally stable nonzero steady state   .                           
 
Starting from initial levels of capital    below the steady state, the model is indeed capable 
of generating a transitional growth path characterized by capital deepening, increasing financial 
intermediation, rising wealth, entry of money managers, decline in fees, but also increasing 
financial sector income both in absolute terms and relative to GDP.  A high level of   ensures 
equilibrium uniqueness by bounding the role of the wealth preservation service provided by the 
financial sector.  If   and thus the return from growth services is low, a high capital stock may 
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alone create a strong demand for financial services, generating massive entry of intermediaries in 
the economy, in turn sustaining massive investment. A large   creates a sizeable demand for 
financial intermediation regardless of the wealth preservation component, precluding the possibility 
of multiple equilibria. 
 
5.2 Empirical Predictions of The Model with Entry 
The possibility of entry of new intermediaries does not affect the ability of our model to 
account for the main patterns of evolution of the financial sector.  As illustrated by Lemma 2, the 
share of GDP coming from finance increases over time (again due to wealth preservation services), 
and adverse shocks to investor trust reduce the income going to money managers.  The new twist 
here is that some of these effects now occur through entry of new intermediaries.  Most notably, 
part of the reason why the income of the financial sector grows over time is that the entry of new 
intermediaries increases the proximity of money managers to investors, increasing risk taking and 
the size of the financial sector.   
This process of increasing participation into risk taking implies that despite the reduction in 
the equilibrium unit fee   
 , the unit cost of financial intermediation may actually increase as the 
financial sector expands.   To see this, note that the total amount of financial assets in the economy 
at time  , which includes “safe storage securities” and risky assets is equal to     , the total wealth 
of the elderly.  At the same time, the total income absorbed by the financial sector is equal to the fee 
times risky investment   
      
        , where    is the wealth share that the elderly allocate to 
risk taking.  The unit cost of financial intermediation is then given by: 
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As the financial sector grows, unit fees   
  fall but the composition of investment shifts toward 
riskier assets:    rises.  As we show in Appendix B, the latter effect may actually dominate, causing 
unit costs of intermediation to rise over time. 
This idea can help reconcile the French (2008) finding that in the last 30 years unit fees 
have come down for equity mutual funds with the evidence presented in Figure 5 that the average 
unit cost of finance – measured as finance income over financial assets – has increased significantly 
after the Great Depression and then remained roughly constant after 1980 (using a different 
measure, Philippon 2012 also finds that the average unit cost of finance has slightly increased).  The 
big increase in unit cost after the Depression probably has something to do with recovery of trust 
and increased risk-taking as the memory of the Depression receded.  In addition, the relative 
stability of unit cost in recent years might be related to the entry of new intermediaries in response 
to increased wealth, shifting the composition of investments to more intermediated and thus more 
expensive forms of finance. 
These compositional effects may be stronger if money managers can introduce new, riskier, 
assets. Because these assets rely more on the lubricating role of trust, they may be purchased by 
investors only if the latter are sufficiently close to their preferred manager.  A highly trusted 
manager would introduce new investment options to leverage his trust capital and extract higher 
fees.9  The compositional shift toward higher-risk, nonstandard investments may also constitute a 
force preventing unit costs from falling over time. 
 
                                                          
9 To see the logic behind this intuition, note that in our model unit fees increase in the return paid by the 
financial asset (see Equation (7)).  Intuitively, the higher the return earned by investors, the higher the rent 
that the trusted money manager can extract.  As a consequence, the introduction of a higher return-higher risk 
financial asset by a trusted money manager allows the manager to charge higher fees to investors, increasing 
the average cost of intermediation.  To simplify the analysis, we only consider the choice between a riskless 
(and thus non-intermediated) asset and a risky asset.  We leave the formal analysis of the case of multiple 
risky assets to future research. 
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6. Conclusion. 
 We have presented a Solow-style growth model in which the financial claims on the capital 
stock are managed by professionals.  In that model, the size of the financial sector depends both on 
the economy’s GDP and on its stock of capital or wealth.   The model accounts for some key facts 
about the development of the financial sector in the last century. 
 To begin, the model explains why financial sector has grown relative to GDP over time 
(Figure 1 from Philippon 2012).  The reason is that one of the functions of finance is to preserve the 
existing stock of wealth, and wealth has grown over time relative to income, as one would expect 
along the adjustment path to the steady state.   The model thus also predicts the growth of the 
wealth to GDP ratio over time, shown in Figure 4 and more broadly by Piketty and Zucman (2012).   
 Equally important, our model’s emphasis on trust helps explain aspects of the volatility of 
the financial sector.  Our approach links the sharp decline of finance in the Great Depression, and 
its slow recovery over the following 50 years, to the rapid decline and subsequent slow recovery of 
trust.  Part of that recovery is exogenous, as the memory of the Great Depression recedes, but part 
of it is also endogenous in our model, since increases in wealth encourage entry by financial 
intermediaries, which creates high trust relationships.       
 Our model also seeks to reconcile the somewhat conflicting evidence on the fees and unit 
costs of the financial sector.  French (2008) presents evidence that fees on equity mutual funds have 
declined over time (French 2008), whereas Philippon (2012) and Figure 5 show no evidence of 
declining “unit cost” of finance.  According to our analysis, an important byproduct of economic 
growth, entry by financial intermediaries, and reduction in fees is that investors allocate increasing 
shares of their wealth to intermediated financial products, rather than to self-storage.  This implies 
that the composition of investor portfolios shifts over time to riskier, and hence more expensive, 
financial products.  This can lead to increases in unit costs, even as fees for given products decline.   
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 Previous scholars took the evidence on the growth of finance as an indication of problems 
with the market economy and the financial system.  Without denying the importance of rent-
seeking, agency, and other problems, our paper presents a more benign view.  Finance should grow 
as an economy matures, because the preservation of wealth is an increasingly important function of 
the financial system.   
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Figure 1. Financial Sector Income/GDP 
 
Notes: VA is value added, WN is compensation of employees, “fin” means finance and insurance, “fire” means finance, 
insurance, and real estate. For “NIPA”, the data source is the BEA, and for “Hist” the source is the Historical Statistics of 
the United States. Directly from Philippon (2012). 
Figure 4. Financial Assets/GDP 
 
Source: Philippon (2012) and Flow of Funds. Non-financial sectors include households, nonfarm businesses.  
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Figure 5. Financial Sector Income/Financial Assets 
 
Source: Philippon (2012) and Flow of Funds. Non-financial sectors include households, nonfarm businesses.  
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Appendix A: Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1.  By plugging Equation (12) into (11), it is easy to see that in any steady 
state with positive capital stock      and such that     , is identified by the equation: 
   
                    
 [          ] 
 (  
 
 
)               
which can be rewritten as: 
  [         ]  [                 ]                                             
where   
 
      (  
 
 
)      
.  It is easy to verify the above equation admits a unique solution      
provided    , which imposes an upper bound on  . 
Before studying the steady state, let us verify that      (and in particular that this is so 
for all investors).   From Equation (12) it is easy to find that the household who is closest to a 
manager invests a share of wealth: 
    
     
  
   [       
      ]
  [  
     ] 
    
where   
 
(  
 
 
)      
.  The function      is increasing in   
    provided   
     , which – as we 
will soon see, it is strictly satisfied at the steady state capital level, and thus along transitional 
dynamics occurring around the steady state.  which implies that starting from a below steady state 
level of capital stock, risk taking increases over time until the steady state is reached.  As a result, 
by exploiting Equation     , all investors set an interior level of risk taking in the steady state 
provided            , where    . By replacing this condition into      we find that this is 
equivalent to: 
  
  [        ]
      
  
which imposes a lower bound on  . The upper and lower bounds are mutually compatible, namely 
  [     +  ]
  +   
  , provided         , which we assume to hold. This analysis thus identifies 
variance bounds  ̅ and  , with  ̅   , to which we restrict the analysis of our model. 
Consider the steady state prevailing for   (   ̅)   This is identified by Equation     . By 
applying the implicit function theorem, and after some algebra, one can find that: 
        
  
  
                    
  [         ]        
                                     
        
  
  
[         ] 
  [         ]        
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where both inequalities rely on the restriction             and    . Condition (P2) intuitively 
says that the steady state capital stock increases in productivity  .  Condition (P3) says that the 
steady state capital stock increases in the number of managers (because lower   reduces  ). 
Consider now the dynamics of the model.  By exploiting Equations (11) and (12), one can 
write the law of motion for our model economy as: 
 
  
 
   
       
[       
      ]
 
 
 
     
                                     
The above difference equation implicitly defines a function          whose slope is equal to: 
   
     
 
 
    
    
    
   
       
[       
      ]
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    (
   
  
     
)
[       
            ]
[       
      ]
}
  
At the           steady state, the above slope becomes equal to: 
   
     
 
 
 
    
Where the inequality is due to the assumption      As a result, the zero capital steady state is 
unstable, and the mapping          must cut the 45 degrees line at the interior steady state  
  with 
a slope less than one, implying that    is locally stable. 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 At the steady state capital sock        , the new productivity level    sets 
the wage rate, fees and intermediation at time  . In particular, investment and intermediation are 
pinned down by the equations: 
  +    +   
  
 
   
  +    +     
            + 
      
 [     + 
   ] 
 (  
 
 
)  
where  
  
 
  is by definition invariant to changes in  , for the initial capital stock is predetermined.  
Consider the effects of a change in  . The impact of such change on investment and intermediation 
is determined by the behavior of the ratio   +    +    +     .  By the proof of proposition 1 we 
know that such ratio is an increasing function of   +  and a decreasing function of   at the steady 
state capital level.  As a result, by the implicit function theorem, a drop in productivity reduces 
financial intermediation and the capital stock   + .  The relative size of the financial sector depends 
on the effect of the productivity change on the product    + 
   .  Denote     + 
     .  The relatie 
size of finance increases with  .  In this regard, note that the equilibrium condition 
    
            
 
 , where  is a constant, can be rewritten as: 
  
 
[  +      ]   
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After some algebra, one can check that the left hand side of the above equation increases in  .  As a 
result, an increase in   reduces   and thus the relative size of the financial sector, while a drop in   
does the reverse. Finally, consider the long run response. It is easy to see from the Proof of 
Proposition 1 and from Equation (P1), financial intermediation drops in the long run and the relative 
size of the financial sector remains constant. 
Consider now the effect of a change in trust  .  The equilibrium condition is the same as the one 
represented above.  Because the function   +    +     increases in  , higher trust increases 
investment and intermediation, while a drop in trust does the reverse.  Accordingly, because also the 
function   +         increases in  , an increase in trust on impact increases the relative size of the 
financial sector while a reduction in trust does the reverse.  Finally, in the Proof of Proposition 1 we 
also establish that long run intermediation and the long run relative size of finance increase in trust.        
 
Proof of Lemma 2.  By inspection of Equations (16) and (17). 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 With endogenous entry, the evolution of the economy is described by the 
following equations: 
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Equation      is essentially the same law of motion of the Proof of Proposition 1, with the only 
difference that now    (and thus   ) are endogenously determined in Equation     . 
In the spirit of the Proof of Proposition 1, we can rewrite (P5) as: 
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By replacing in Equation      the expression for       and by denoting      [
     
 
   ], we 
can find after some algebra that: 
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Where     
   .  This equation has a unique solution for      in (0,1) which we denote by     .      
By replacing the expression for      in the expressions for    and    in Equation     , we 
find after some algebra that the law of motion of the economy is given by: 
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Where again we have that     
   . The above difference equation has one trivial steady state at 
      .  A positive and unique steady state exists provided: i) the root multiplying   
  on the 
left hand side above is monotonically increasing in  , ii) the value of the root at     is below 
       . The latter condition is met when the variance   is sufficiently low. On the other hand, a 
sufficient condition for i) is that: 
      
     
 
   i      i i             
Intuitively, in this case the main effect of higher   is to increase the numerator, leaving the 
denominator almost unaffected (also because in this case       stays small).  When this is the case, 
then, there is a unique interior equilibrium     .  This equilibrium is locally stable (so that the 
capital stock monotonically converges to it) provided the slope of the implicit mapping          is 
above one at the      steady state.  One can check that this is the case provided   is sufficiently 
high and   is above a threshold (consistent with the previous upper bound).  The condition that   be 
bounded is the same as the one required in Proposition 1, except that now the bounds are evaluated 
at the equilibrium number of managers prevailing when     as entailed by     .  Since      
does not depend on productivity  , the assumption that   be sufficiently large can be added to 
ensure stability of the system.  Note that when       is made small, the upper and lower bound will 
be consistent because locally entry responds slowly to changes in the capital stock, so that around 
    the analysis does not virtually change from that with a fixed number of money managers.        
 
Appendix B: Extensions and Additional Proofs.  
B.1 Population Growth and Technological Progress 
In the main model, we have assumed that population – and thus labor supply – is constant at 
     and that total factor productivity takes a constant value of  .  We now allow for population 
growth and for productivity augmenting technological progress and investigate how these features 
affect the evolution of the financial sector.  We do so by assuming that the effective labor supply 
available at time   satifies the law of motion: 
                   
where   is the rate of population growth and   is the rate of technical progress.  Because the 
production function is Cobb-Douglas, this formulation of labor augmenting technical progress is 
equivalent to one in which productivity growth is factor-neutral and increases the value of  . 
 Denoting by  ̂        the capital stock per unit of effective labor, the competitive 
remunerations of a unit of effective labor and of a unit of capital are respectively given by:       
       ̂ 
      
            ̂ 
           ̂ 
     
where the second expression implies, consistent with our previous analysis, that the average return 
on a unit of capital is equal to  {  }       ̂ 
   , while the variance of the return to capital is 
equal to             [    ̂ 
   ]
 
. 
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Thus far, the only implication of introducing population growth and technical progress is 
that factor remunerations are functions of the capital per effective unit of labor  ̂ .  This implies that 
the share of wage income invested into risky asset also depends in  ̂ , namely:     
   
     (     ̂ 
     )
 [    ̂ 
   ]
  (  
 
 
)  
The absolute value    of the capital stock created at time   is then equal to a fraction    of 
the total wage bill paid to workers at    , which is equal to         , namely            
        By dividing both sides by   , and by replacing in the equation the expression for     , we 
find that the law of motion of the capital stock per unit of effective labor is given by: 
 ̂  
  
          
        ̂   
   
The law of motion characterizing the capital stock per unit of effective labor is very similar 
to that described in Equation (11) of our basic model, except that the fraction of wealth invested in 
the risky asset is scaled down by the constant population and productivity growth rates. 
In light of the previous analysis, several immediate consequences follow.  First, the capital 
stock per unit of effective labor converges to a nonzero steady state value  ̂  that is a decreasing 
function of   and  .  In this steady state, the per-capita capital stock and per capita output grow at a 
constant rate  , while the extent of risk taking    converges to a constant.  The comparative statics 
properties described by Proposition 1 continue to hold with respect to the steady state levels of the 
per capita capital stock and of the extent of risk taking. 
Second, the properties of evolution of the financial sector also do not change from 
Corollary 1.  The management fee per unit of capital declines over time as  ̂  increases toward its 
steady state level.  As a consequence, financial sector income rises faster than value added if we 
express both the numerator and the denominator in per effective units of labor.   
Finally, the qualitative properties of Corollary 2 also hold in this modified model.  In sum, 
population and productivity growth introduce additional reasons for the growth of the absolute size 
and profits of the financial sector, but do not affect the qualitative behavior of scaled variables such 
as unit fees and the income share going to finance. 
  
B.2 Trading and Valuation of the Capital Stock 
In our baseline model consumption and capital are the same good, so that the elderly 
consume the capital stock they own at the end of their lives.  This assumption simplifies the 
analysis, but it raises the issue of whether our result are robust to the more realistic setting in which 
capital cannot be converted back into consumption and so the elderly must sell their capital stock to 
the young.  To shed light on this issue, suppose now that the consumption can be transformed into 
capital but capital cannot be converted back into consumption.  This implies that at time   the 
elderly of the generation born at time     must sell the economy’s capital stock to the current 
young generation.  The amount of capital held by the elderly at the end of time   is equal to      . 
If the price of capital in terms of consumption is   , the value at time   of the supply of capital in 
terms of consumption goods is equal to         .  On the demand side, the consumption income 
available to the young born at time   to buy – through money managers – the entire capital stock 
from the elderly is equal to   +    .  Of course, the young only demand capital from the elderly if 
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the price of existing capital is not higher than the resource cost of creating new capital, i.e. provided 
    , which importantly affects equilibrium prices. 
To find the equilibrium price   , we must determine whether the capital stock       
available at time   is below or above the desired investment   +     by the young born at  .  If the 
young wish to increase the stock of capital, namely          +    , the equilibrium price of 
capital settles at      so as to make savers indifferent between buying existing capital goods and 
creating new ones.  If instead the young wish to reduce the stock of capital, namely          +  
  , then the new capital goods will not be produced and the price drops to    
      
     
   so as to 
equate the values of the demand and the supply of capital goods. 
Because our main results focus on transitions occurring below the steady state, let us 
consider the implications of this analysis for changes in the valuation of capital markets during 
these transitions.  Recall that in these transitions, the desired capital stock increases over time, 
namely   +    +       .  As a consequence, if the potential shocks    are sufficiently small 
that below the steady state capital the condition         +     holds (at least when    is far 
enough from the steady state), then during the transitional growth phase the unit price of capital 
stays constant at     .  In each period, the elderly sell their capital       to the young, who add 
extra investment to implement their desired capital stock   +    . The ex-post shock    affects 
consumption by the elderly and new investment by the young, but leaves the aggregate capital stock 
next period unaffected.  The law of motion of the economy is then identical to Equation (11): the 
possibility to trade capital goods does not affect how the economy converges to the steady state. 
The possibility of trading in capital goods, however, affects the interpretation of our results.  
In particular, the capital stock    can now be interpreted as the market valuation of the aggregate 
wealth of the economy.   The fact that the income share of the financial sector raises with    can 
then be viewed as the product of increasing capital market valuations.  It should be noted, however, 
that in our model these valuations rise through the extensive margin – as new investment takes 
place – and not through increases in their unitary valuation   , which remains constant at 1.  
Allowing for changes in   , potentially through asset price bubbles, is an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
 
B.3: Competitive Entry of Intermediaries and the Growth of Financial Sector Income 
We now show that it is possible that the unit cost of finance (the ratio of financial sector income 
over financial assets):   
  
                      (  
  
 
)  
       
       
 [     
   ] 
  
may increase over time, as new intermediaries enter the market.  To see why this may be the case, 
note that during transitional growth, the capital stock    increases while the distance between 
managers    decreases.  As a result, a sufficient condition for the product   
    to increase over time 
is that the terms that are functions of    decrease in    while ratio which is a function of    
increases in   .  It is immediate to see that the ratio on the right increases in    provided      .  
On the other hand, one can find values such that the first term (which is a polynomial of degree 5) 
decreases in    (e.g.    close to  ). It is beyond the scope of this analysis to evaluate under what 
exact conditions unit costs may be increasing, but it seems that – given that    is pinned down by   
– one may be able to find economies (values of   and of the initial capital stock) for which the 
equilibrium    is indeed close to   and unit costs increase over time until the steady state is reached. 
